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“In the beginning” is a phrase well known 
to those who are reading this essay.  However, this 
time the quotation finds its source not in Scripture 
but in another source.  The passage from which 
this phrase is drawn reads as follows:
First, there is the beginning.
In the beginning there was nothing.  Absolute 
void, not merely empty space.  There was no 
space; nor was there time, for this was before 
time. The universe was without form and void. 
By chance there was a fluctuation….From 
absolute nothing, absolutely without inter-
vention, there came into being rudimentary 
existence.1
This quotation opens  the final chapter of Peter 
Atkins’ book Creation Revisited.  Atkins is a physical 
chemist who has also written extensively for popular 
audiences.  In Creation Revisited, Atkins makes 
the argument that the universe came into being 
as a result of random events and is not in need 
of any sort of Supreme Being to create it.  In this 
last chapter, Atkins is very clearly taking his form 
and style from Genesis 1 but is reinterpreting it in 
light of his materialistic worldview.  Throughout 
this book, Atkins argues that the universe is very 
simple, and that everything in the universe can be 
understood and explained in terms of a handful 
of basic physical principles.  Atkins ends his book 
with this cold conclusion:  “In such a universe there 
is still no purpose behind the benevolence of the 
forces” and “That still does not imply a purpose; we 
can still remain the children of aimless chance.”2 
By now it is clear that Atkins is an atheist, one who 
sees the universe as nothing more than a collection 
of physical objects that came about by the purely 
coincidental balance of forces.
Atkins is the type of person that Wiker 
and Witt take to task in their recent book, A 
Meaningful World, although they do not cite him 
directly.  Wiker and Witt open with a story about 
an alien who visits Earth and who, in an attempt to 
understand the despair rampant in human culture 
during our time of modern prosperity, concludes, 
“ ‘A poison has entered human culture…. It’s 
the assumption that science has proven that the 
universe is without purpose, without meaning—
proven it so clearly that one need not even 
produce an argument.’…The poison, however, is 
real.  This book is written as an antidote” (13). 
by Carl P. Fictorie
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believes in clarity, claiming that everything in 
the universe can ultimately be understood by us 
humans.  The universe is also harmonious, with 
the particles and forces working together, and 
explicable, in terms of a yet-to-be-discovered 
single equation.  Finally, Newton’s equations 
of motion, the four laws of thermodynamics, 
quantum mechanics, and even the periodic table 
are elegant, encapsulating grace and form while 
being simple and effective.  That is, even though 
the universe is replete with characteristics of genius, 
it can be explained in purely material terms.  In 
fact, in Atkins’ thinking, humans, including 
Shakespeare, have evolved, ultimately from the 
Big Bang, via a series of chance events that need 
no more explanation than the material processes of 
entropy and natural selection.4  But in explaining 
it that way, the materialist necessarily narrows 
the meaning of the very terms used.  Atheists still 
use the term “meaning,” but they do so only in 
reference to the relationships in the data and make 
their explanation in terms of mechanistic natural 
laws.
Referring to “meaning,” Wiker and Witt 
identify the heart of the matter:  “meaninglessness 
Atkins is an unapologetic modern prophet of this 
purposeless universe, and he is significant because 
he has written several popular works interpreting 
fundamental physical laws, has written several 
popular chemistry textbooks, and has served 
on national and international committees that 
have produced educational materials.  Atkins is 
the kind of intellectual professor that defines the 
establishment within the university.
Wiker and Witt then proceed to develop their 
primary thesis—that the universe is “meaning-
full.”3  They open, not by describing what they 
understand of the concept of meaningful but rather 
how they understand the concept of meaningless. 
They characterize meaningless in the sense that 
the inherent meaning in things is not absent but 
has been lost and needs to be rediscovered, in the 
same manner that a new language needs to be 
learned.  As they develop their idea of meaning, 
they introduce the notion of genius to suggest 
that nature shows undeniable evidence of genius 
and, therefore, requires a creator/designer as an 
explanation of this  genius.
The argument that Wiker and Witt use is 
original, starting with the works of Shakespeare 
as a model for understanding meaning and 
genius. Wiker and Witt give us a set of criteria 
to explain what constitutes a work of genius (75-
78), characteristics that include depth (of meaning, 
vocabulary, etc.), clarity (neither obscure nor drab 
but able  to communicate so that we comprehend, 
but not easily), harmony (all things working 
together), and elegance (a coherent and pleasing 
unity in diversity the opposite of deconstruction). 
They show that Shakespeare, given the depth, 
clarity, harmony, and elegance of his works, is 
a genius.  From this idea, they conclude that 
genius is only possible when there is a real author 
who wrote the poetry and plays, and cannot be 
the result of random chance.  Hence, if a work, 
any work, displays the marks of genius, one can 
reasonably conclude that it is the product of 
purposeful design.
This would be a good argument except that 
Atkins could similarly describe the universe with 
these same adjectives, all the while maintaining 
his reductionistic, materialistic worldview.  It takes 
relatively little study to conclude that the universe 
illustrates depth, ranging from subatomic particles 
all the way to clusters of galaxies.  Atkins certainly 
Referring to “meaning,” 
Wiker and Witt identify 
the heart of the matter:  
“meaninglessness is 
only an assumption, a 
dogma that keeps many 
from seeing what should 
be obvious” (17).  It 
is, we might add, an 
assumption grounded in 
the sinful nature of the 
heart of man himself.
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is only an assumption, a dogma that keeps many 
from seeing what should be obvious” (17).  It is, 
we might add, an assumption grounded in the 
sinful nature of the heart of man himself.  If, as 
the authors argue, evil is “parasitic on good” (29, 
251), and the assumption of meaninglessness is 
grounded in sin, or evil, then meaninglessness 
is fundamentally a problem of sin and is not a 
secondary concern (251).  
However, Wiker and Witt attempt to argue 
for meaning on the basis of  the state and nature 
of creation.  In this way, they are among those 
who argue for intelligent design.  They believe 
that by immersing the reader in the intricacies of 
nature and by showing that the genius of nature 
parallels the genius of Shakespeare, they will 
provide an antidote to the problem.  But this 
approach is also their weak point.  By failing to 
attack the assumption as an assumption, by failing 
to address the condition of the heart that supports 
this assumption, they fail to make a convincing 
argument and fall short in their task of writing a 
book that serves as an antidote.
That failure does not suggest that the book 
has no value.  What this book does do is remind 
the Christian of the proper understanding of 
nature’s place.  Nature has been created by a genius 
designer, God, and because he is infinitely wise 
and almighty, it follows that creation will display 
the characteristics of a work of ingenious design.  
Wiker and Witt give several eloquent 
examples of how design concepts can help us 
appreciate the interrelationships, potential, beauty, 
and multilevel order in physical constructs such as 
the periodic table and the ubiquitous chemical, 
water.  But simply reminding us of nature’s place 
and increasing our appreciation of its qualities 
will not make this book the antidote they hope 
it will be.  A person who is open to the notion of 
design will find a helpful view of the world and 
will be encouraged to a theistic belief.  However, 
the staunch atheist will not be swayed.  
Wiker and Witt also argue for a designer on the 
basis of human appreciation of beauty. They write, 
“What we deny is the crudely dogmatic reduction 
of the desire for beauty to these [materialistic] levels 
alone….Thus, ours is the more inclusive argument, 
the one that truly describes our entire human 
appreciation of beauty; it doesn’t dogmatically 
exclude the higher or reduce what is higher to the 
lower aspects of our nature” (116-117).  As part 
of their effort to argue for a designer, Wiker and 
Witt argue for an anti-reductionist interpretation 
of nature, thereby using the hierarchy of structure 
to contradict reductionist materialism.  Herein lies 
their challenge:  beauty, intelligence, genius, etc., 
cannot be fully explained or appreciated exclusively 
in terms of physical or material causes.  But that 
argument will not convince an ardent materialist, 
who refuses to look beyond material causes because 
he does not believe there is any other explanation 
needed.  
Atkins appeals to Ockham’s razor to justify his 
reductionism:
Science, as I have said, favours simplic-
ity.  Science is the arch-descendant of 
Ockam.  How dare those theologians so 
obscure the truth by their gildings, their 
hangings, their sentiment, their wishful 
thinking, their personal fears, and their 
network of intrusion into personal liberty!  
They have no right to claim that ‘God’ is 
an extreme simplicity, and as cogent and 
potent an explanation of our origins as is 
necessary.  A ‘God’ is the embodiment of 
complexity, the ultimate antisimplicity. 
 In seeking to understand our origin 
and our purpose science examines whether 
an absolutely minimal approach is suffi-
cient.  Only if a minimal approach is ex-
plicitly demonstrated to be inadequate may 
there be some justification in indulging in 
the soft furnishings of additional hypoth-
eses.5
Atkins claims that God is complex, while science 
seeks the simple.  Atkins sees religion as the 
antithesis to science, basing its explanations on “a 
purposeful, unknowable, and incomprehensible 
irreducible complexity” called God.6  Atkins is 
building his argument on the notion that God 
has historically been used to explain those things 
which science could not.  To Atkins, God is the 
complex being that is needed to fill in the gaps in 
our knowledge.  Therefore, God is obscure because 
he cannot be understood except by the theologian 
(in a very mystical, veiled, and disguised sense).
In addition, Atkins argues that the reductionist 
model of science has enabled humans to develop a 
significant understanding of nature, and in this he 
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is quite correct.  It has been precisely when scientists 
(and the natural philosophers who preceded them) 
were willing to dig into the details of nature, to 
attempt to sort out those areas in which existing 
theories fell short, that our understanding of 
the workings of nature has improved.  That is, 
when humans took the stance that nature is a 
functioning whole, held together by ordered laws 
that are comprehensible to humans and are the 
contingent creative activity of God, our ability to 
discern those patterns really flourished.
In using a reductionist theory, however, 
scientists can begin to do two related things.  First, 
if they do not need to invoke an act of God to 
explain how nature works, they can easily  question 
whether one needs God at all.  Second, if humans 
are able to come to a thorough understanding of 
how nature works apart from a belief in God, they 
can develop hubris, a personal god-complex.  These 
are Atkins’ failings: he has both questioned the 
need for God and, in so doing, displayed hubris.
Wiker and Witt’s fifth chapter, “The Periodic 
Table,” illustrates how patterns of understanding 
in nature can develop when we turn to empirical 
methods.  Their purpose is to use the history of the 
development of the periodic table to show “…how 
many ways human beings as knowers contradict 
the canons of materialist reductionism” (111). 
Starting with the ancient metallurgists, who 
worked with readily available gold to make jewelry 
rather than tools or weapons, Wiker and Witt 
suggest that these first chemists, along with their 
perfumer, potter, and dyer counterparts, worked 
more for the sake of beauty than practicality.  They 
counter the evolutionist, who claims that beauty is 
a consequence of sexual attraction, with the claim 
that this early chemistry operated at other levels 
as well, seeking out beauty for the sake of beauty 
as truth.
They then turn to the intellectual pursuit of 
the notion of elements—to the Greek philosophers 
who sought to understand the ultimate nature of 
matter primarily through reason.  By the beginning 
of the first millennium, we have two parallel threads. 
The artisans had the practical skills to manipulate 
materials into beautiful objects without asking why, 
while the philosophers worked at understanding 
the ultimate nature of matter without necessarily 
working with the actual materials.  The artisans 
are the empiricists who do not build a theoretical 
science, while the philosophers are the rational 
theorists who fail to use empirical data.  
Then they introduce the alchemist, who 
brought the technical skills together with the 
quest for ultimate knowledge, as manifested in 
the philosopher’s stone, and thereby developed 
a vast array of methods and knowledge about 
the chemical world.  In the sense that alchemists 
merged theoretical and practical knowledge, they 
are the first empiricists.  They were driven by a goal 
which was not necessarily useful or ultimate, the 
search to make gold, but which reflects a belief in 
the ultimate order within nature, order that can 
be known.
It is the search for an underlying order that 
led the first modern chemists, including  Boyle 
and Lavoisier, to be open to and seek out new 
elements or, more importantly, to recognize the 
fundamental category of element within nature. 
Boyle is highlighted because it was he who 
emphasized that the study of chemistry is valuable 
in its own right, not because of any practical use 
or base emotion (124).  From this historical study 
outlining the impractical purposes for studying 
nature, Wiker and Witt infer that a raw reductionist 
interpretation—that science is explicable in 
terms of basic instincts—is impossible (145). 
However, this argument is drawing from what the 
evolutionist would claim is recent history in human 
development.  That is, human development started 
with sexual desire, but as humans continued to 
evolve, and their brains developed, other related 
abilities arose, including a curious appreciation for 
beauty and order within nature.
Wiker and Witt also suggest a correlation 
between our conviction of underlying order in 
nature and the actual discovery of that order.  That 
correlation is tutorial in fashion, leading from the 
macroscopic to the microscopic, through multiple 
levels that cannot be explained by accident alone. 
They conclude, “One level of accidental order 
could be the result of chance; multiple layers 
of integrated order, configured in a way that is 
strikingly amenable to discovery, implies conspiracy. 
If we find out through scientific discovery that 
the universe is intricately ordered in a way that 
invites discovery, then it’s most reasonable to cease 
trying to imagine ourselves as the hapless creatures 
of a nihilist cosmos” (145).  This connection is 
overstated, however.  The materialist will argue that 
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when there is sufficient evidence of unlikely events 
occurring, one cannot systematically eliminate 
chance as a possibility.  From the point of view of 
the materialist, then, it is reasonable to conclude 
that bulk-scale order is a necessary consequence of 
simple and fundamental laws.  In addition, being 
creatures within the cosmos necessarily implies 
that we are connected to it and that if we have any 
intelligence, that intelligence would correlate with 
the structure of the cosmos because it is made of 
the stuff of nature. 
Moving from this study of how humans 
develop patterns of understanding nature to a 
discussion of the manner whereby nature itself 
illustrates the genius of design, the sixth chapter 
of Wiker and Witt outlines the argument found 
in The Privileged Planet, by G. Gonzalez and J. 
W. Richards. The argument is grounded in the 
observation that the universe has a number of 
physical properties and fundamental constants, 
which all must be carefully tuned and balanced 
so that humans can exist.  This is known as the 
“anthropic principle.”  Because of the high degree 
of precision needed for these constants, the 
argument suggests that the likelihood of a designer 
behind it is the most reasonable conclusion.  
However, physicists such as Weinberg, whom 
Wiker and Witt cite several times, argue that we 
still do not need a designer.  Rather, we are still 
a product of chance, and it just so happens that 
we are here.  If the universe had not turned out 
the way it did, we would not exist to talk about 
it.  Weinberg interprets this low probability of a 
designer in terms of the “multiple universe theory,” 
which states that other universes have existed, and 
that we are just part of one that allowed us to 
come into being.7 Wiker and Witt simply dismiss 
this conclusion (169), even though it is the one 
Weinberg’s own science suggests.8  In modern 
physics the most fundamental theory of matter is 
called “string theory.”  While it is still a very new 
theory, and largely hypothetical at this point, the 
work done on this theory so far suggests that there 
may be a large, potentially infinite, number of 
solutions to the models within this theory.  
According to Weinberg, the way to interpret 
this infinite number of solutions is to postulate 
multiple universes, a different universe for each 
solution to the model.  However, each of these 
universes would remain inaccessible to us, so this 
part of the model is not testable.  Weinberg justifies 
this conclusion with the comment, “The test of a 
physical theory is not that everything in it should 
be observable and every prediction it makes should 
be testable, but rather that enough is observable 
and enough predictions are testable to give us 
confidence that the theory is right.” 9  Weinberg 
himself is admitting, in effect, that science cannot 
answer every question, and that some things have 
to be inferred beyond the available data.  
Wiker and Witt miss an opportunity to 
challenge the presupposition of this materialist. 
Weinberg, given his materialism, concludes that 
the material explanation, multiple universes, is 
correct; he also concludes that our existence is now 
highly probable because with an infinite number 
of universes, at least one will produce us.  On the 
other hand, given that we cannot observe alternate 
universes (even though they may be conceptually 
possible), it seems equally reasonable to infer that 
only one universe exists, the one we are in, and 
that the particular universe we inhabit was chosen, 
with the fine-tuning of the constants carefully 
selected, to make us possible.  In other words, it 
What this book does 
do is remind the 
Christian of the proper 
understanding of 
nature’s place.  Nature 
has been created by 
a genius designer, 
God, and because he 
is infinitely wise and 
almighty, it follows that 
creation will display the 
characteristics of a work 
of ingenious design.
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would seem that a creator hypothesis is no less 
reasonable a conclusion than that of Weinberg.  
But at this point we are now reaching beyond 
the current boundary of science.  Weinberg suggests 
that we exist in the one universe, out of an infinite 
number of universes available that can support our 
existence, while Gonzales and Richards submit that 
the uniqueness of our universe is best explained as 
the work of an intelligent designer.  The reason for 
choosing between these two metaphysical options 
cannot, by the admission of both sides, be directly 
proven from the available evidence.  Therefore, 
one has to make the choice based on other sources 
of information.
 Weinberg and Atkins would claim that 
there is no other admissible information, that we 
have sufficient explanation with the materialistic 
understanding, so everything else is superficial. 
However, we are able to draw other conclusions 
based on this line of reasoning.  Weinberg and 
Atkins both understand that in a purely material 
universe, the idea of purpose has no meaning 
and that, therefore,  our existence is no more 
significant than the existence of any animal, plant, 
or, for that matter, mineral.  Nor is there any basis 
for morality beyond mere social contract, if that 
even.  We lack significance in a universe that is 
unimportant.  Atkins explains this way:
My scientific world-view is bleak in terms 
of its origins, its motivations, and its future. 
…If everything in the world can be accom-
modated in this bony view, then there is no 
justification to impose on our understand-
ing the hypothetical extraneous. …I main-
tain that all the softenings of my absolutely 
barren view of the foundations of this won-
derful, extraordinary, and delightful world 
are sentimental wishful thinking. …I long 
for immortality, but I know that my only 
hope of achieving it is through science and 
medicine, not through sentiment and its 
subsets, art and theology.10
In addition, if we are the product of a random series 
of material events, then we must also wonder if we 
have any freedom to act in a meaningful way.  If 
everything is governed by laws which are ultimately 
random, our actions cannot be intentional and are, 
therefore, utterly meaningless.
 It is a wonder that such reasoning has not led 
Atkins to a life of despair about his own existence. 
However, Atkins takes some solace in his ability 
to understand nature.  For Atkins, science is 
omnicompetent and eventually will come to an 
explanation of everything.  Science is, for him, the 
“summit of knowledge”11 and will give humans 
knowledge of everything.  In other words, in Atkins 
world, we will become the omnicompetent gods of 
the universe and then die and cease to exist.
 Still, both Weinberg12 and Atkins13 
acknowledge that the most basic of human-made 
theories will not be able to comprehensively 
explain the details of life, consciousness, beauty, or 
On the other hand, 
we can also consider 
the implications of a 
designer hypothesis.  If 
that hypothesis is true, 
an ultimate reference 
point to the universe 
exists, and “meaning” 
takes on a genuine 
significance.  We do 
need to wonder what 
this designer is like and 
what our relationship 
to him might be.  With 
a reference point, our 
existence is important, 
and good and evil 
mean something real.  
Obviously, Wiker and 
Witt take this stance.
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the weather.  This is already evident at the level of 
the atom.  Quantum mechanics is a mathematical 
model, based on physical laws, that is used to 
describe and explain the nature of the atom. 
However, the mathematics are impossible to solve 
exactly, except in the most simple of chemical 
systems, the hydrogen atom.  That is, chemists find 
it necessary to invoke uniquely chemical concepts 
such as electronegativity and molecular geometry 
into the quantum mechanical model in order to 
simplify the features of more complex systems, 
including all compounds.  Thus, in one sense, 
chemistry is not reducible to simple physical laws. 
What Weinberg and Atkins do argue is that the 
models provide a mechanism, even if we cannot 
precisely calculate the outcomes.  If we extend this 
notion to the concept of life, it is likely that we 
will again be faced with an approximation.  Even if 
the entire machinery of the cell is little more than 
biochemical molecules and reactions, it is unlikely 
that chemical models alone could be constructed 
with sufficient detail to explain every detail of 
the cell’s function.  This does leave the ardent 
materialist with a conundrum.  In this worldview, 
the universe is a closed system, governed by simple 
physical laws.  However, the human intellect will 
never be able to infer the universe from this single 
law because the consequences of the law quickly 
become far too complex to use directly.  Our 
minds and the tools available to us are unable to 
fully grasp the universe.  In fact, if we did grasp 
every detail in the universe, we would necessarily 
become a god.  What Weinberg and Atkins believe, 
then, is that even though the human mind will be 
able to understand the laws themselves and thus 
be able to infer mechanism and order from these 
basic laws, these inferences will not be particularly 
useful or satisfying to people as a whole.  We will 
still continue to use models and concepts from the 
levels of reality we are immediately dealing with to 
understand nature.
 On the other hand, we can also consider the 
implications of a designer hypothesis.  If that 
hypothesis is true, an ultimate reference point to the 
universe exists, and “meaning” takes on a genuine 
significance.  We do need to wonder what this 
designer is like and what our relationship to him 
might be.  With a reference point, our existence is 
important, and good and evil mean something real. 
Obviously, Wiker and Witt take this stance.
 As their book progresses, Wiker and Witt 
continue to emphasize the meaning and genius 
evident in the structure of nature.  In a further 
discussion of chemistry, they elaborate on the 
depth and clarity of the periodic table, noting 
how this depth and clarity enable students to 
master the table’s organization in a series of 
increasingly detailed steps.  They also provide a 
detailed discussion of the nature and properties of 
water, with a particular emphasis on the unique 
characteristics of water that make it particularly 
suitable for the existence of life on Earth, observing 
that this suitability illustrates the full meaning of 
water.  The remaining chapters consider the nature 
of life itself.  Unfortunately, here Wiker and Witt 
drift away from a detailed interpretation of the 
fundamental properties of organisms, concluding 
that the complexity of the cell is inexplicable in 
pure physical terms, given the incredible amount 
of structure and information present.  In the end, 
they appeal to the “commonsense” conclusion that 
life is real, based more on a linguistic analysis than 
an appeal to basic science.  
 By the end, they shift from a positive argument 
for design, such as the genius of the periodic table 
or the careful design of the physical constants of 
the universe, to a more negative stance with the 
claim that biological life is inexplicable in chemical 
terms.  Throughout this discussion, they not only 
point out gaps in knowledge that suggest a level 
of order that cannot be explained in reductionist 
terms, but also describe  the depth, clarity, 
harmony, and elegance of these phenomena. 
Even though these arguments are refreshing 
reading for the Christian, who too often forgets 
about the meaning and purpose of the universe 
(which is to glorify God), they will not sway the 
materialist because the arguments presuppose an 
open universe, which the materialist categorically 
denies.
 Furthermore, Wiker and Witt’s conclusion 
does not stand.  They correlate the materialists’ 
philosophical assumptions with the four-element 
theory of Aristotle and the phlogiston theory, and 
they conclude  that because science showed these 
theories to be wrong, reductionist materialism 
should also be rejected as wrong, given the 
amount of evidence in support of order, meaning, 
and genius in nature.  However, they fail to read 
history correctly on this point.  Yes, those theories 
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of nature were rejected, but they were rejected 
because they made explicit statements about the 
structure of nature that were testable; in other 
words, they were rejected by the normal process 
of scientific elimination through experimentation. 
In fact, reductionist materialism has generally been 
a very fruitful method of approaching science, 
and it still appears to be quite useful.  It is also a 
fundamental principle, an assumption about the 
nature of science.  As an assumption, rather than 
a hypothesis or theory, it is not directly tested or 
considered testable.  Scientists take for granted the 
notion that nature can be understood; they do not 
attempt to test this assumption.
 The leap that reductionists take is their 
conclusion that materialism is a sufficient 
explanation for all phenomena.  They reason that 
if they have a physical explanation that is sound, or 
predicts other phenomena, it is complete, and they 
know all they need to know. They don’t need to 
see it as “masterfully arranged and elegant”—this 
is not a useful or predictive category.  
 Unfortunately, a pervasive problem in Wiker 
and Witt’s book is the tendency to belittle and 
caricature the reductionist materialist. Too often 
their claims are rejected as unreasonable or illogical. 
This tendency, which is the outcome of failing to 
confront the assumptions that materialists hold, 
results from a confrontation model rather than a 
conversation model of discussion.14
 This discussion is important, however, because 
it a metaphysical discussion, not one working 
within the bounds of science itself.  The materialist 
works from the assumption that the universe is 
closed, while the theist works from the assumption 
that the universe is open.  Both are able to use the 
data of nature, and the theories that explain that 
data, to argue for their position. 
 It is unfortunate, then, that Wiker and 
Witt choose not to address the metaphysical 
underpinnings of reductionist materialism.  They do 
touch on it in the last chapter.  First, they note that 
materialists are “blinded by their many successes in 
using the mechanistic analogy to explain natural 
phenomena”(246).  In this they are quite correct, 
but they somewhat miss the underlying cause. 
They continue: “[s]uch blindness is actually a form 
of the most ancient of sins, pride”(246).  Pride 
comes from the deeper sin of believing one does 
not need a creator.   Materialists are blinded by 
their own assumption that the universe is closed. 
With this assumption firmly entrenched in their 
minds, it is impossible for them to see beyond the 
material.  They are blind to design, not because of 
their pride but because of their closed minds.
 Wiker and Witt close by suggesting that the 
loss of meaning is a more basic problem than 
the problem of evil.  “Evil is parasitic on good” 
they rightly say (251).  However, the sin that 
is at the root of evil has infected all aspects of 
creation, therefore corrupting our understanding 
of meaning.  Nature suffers as a result of sin, so 
our sin-laden hearts see a universe also stained by 
sin, thereby making it much more difficult to see 
meaning, genius, order, and purpose.  That is, the 
evidence appears flawed, compromised, so that it 
Unfortunately, a 
pervasive problem 
in Wiker and Witt’s 
book is the tendency to 
belittle and caricature 
the reductionist 
materialist. Too often 
their claims are rejected 
as unreasonable or 
illogical.  This tendency, 
which is the outcome 
of failing to confront 
the assumptions that 
materialists hold, results 
from a confrontation 
model rather than a 
conversation model of 
discussion.
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is not irrefutable but enables the sinful heart to 
conclude that the universe is nothing but matter 
and that nothing else matters.
 Francis Schaeffer puts it this way:
Is it possible to have intellectual integrity 
while holding to the position of verbal-
ized, propositional revelation?  I would 
say the answer is this:  It is not possible if 
you hold the presupposition of the unifor-
mity of natural causes in a closed system.  
If you do, any idea of revelation becomes 
nonsense.  If is not only that there are de-
tailed problems in such a case, but that it 
becomes absolute nonsense if you really be-
lieve in the uniformity of natural causes in 
a closed system—namely, that everything 
is a machine….Propositional, verbalized 
revelation—knowledge that man has from 
God—is a totally unthinkable concept.  
This is because by definition everything is 
a machine, so naturally there is no knowl-
edge from outside, from God….[I]f you are 
going to hold to the uniformity of natural 
causes in the closed system, against all the 
evidence (and I do insist it is against the ev-
idence), then you will never, never be able 
to consider the other presupposition which 
was the basis for modern science in the first 
place:  the uniformity of natural causes in a 
limited system, open to reordering by God 
and by man.15
 Wiker and Witt discuss a wide array of 
evidence that the universe is not a closed system, 
both in terms of the genius that is man and the 
structure of the universe.  In doing so, they will 
aid the knowledge and faith of the believer.  They 
understand that faith can be built on sound 
evidence from the structure of creation.  But this 
evidence will not be the antidote they hope because 
the flaw is not in nature itself but in the assumption 
of a closed universe, which, by definition, cannot 
interact with anything from the outside.
 In the end, it comes down to a simple choice. 
Do you choose to believe the evidence that the 
universe has a designer, or do you choose to believe 
that it does not?  If you choose the former, you have 
opened yourself to the idea that the universe is not 
closed, that there is a God.  It follows that you 
then have to consider who this God is and what 
your relationship to him might be.  If you choose 
the latter, you have deduced that the universe is 
closed, and if it is closed, there is no meaning or 
purpose to existence; you are merely the accidental 
outcome of a long series of random events.
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